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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
30 January 1973

D/CRS
(DLB/CRS)

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Vietnam
(As of 0800 EST)

1. Communist military action continues to taper off although a number of small incidents have been reported from widespread sectors of South Vietnam. There has been no significant action in the major trouble spots, including Tay Ninh City. Elsewhere, the South Vietnamese continue to mop up pockets of enemy troops still holding on in some small towns and villages and along several major highways. There are some signs that a few enemy units are awaiting the arrival of the ICCS teams before raising their flags, probably to deter government reaction.
2. The South Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS) has listed a total of 548 enemy violations through the morning of 30 January. Of the total, some 308 incidents were classified as ground attacks (but the South Vietnamese count as few as three enemy troops attacking a population center as a ground attack). The JGS also claims that some 236 of the 315 hamlets attacked throughout South Vietnam have been retaken, leaving 79 in the contested category.
3. In its most authoritative statement yet on the subject, Peking again has strongly endorsed the Vietnam agreement and urged the Vietnamese Communists to comply with the pact's central provisions. The

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statement is in the form of a message signed by Mao, Chou En-lai, and two other senior Chinese leaders and sent to North Vietnamese and Viet Cong officials. The message called on the South Vietnamese Communists in concert with the "other two political forces" (Saigon and the neutralists) to "speedily" set up a Council of National Reconciliation and Concord and lower-level councils with an eye toward elections and decisions on the political future of South Vietnam. It also expressed Peking's "wish" that Hanoi concentrate on political and economic development in the North.

4. By repeatedly referring to the agreement as a Vietnamese Communist "victory" and otherwise implying a sense of finality about the war, the message--like the editorial carried by People's Daily this past weekend--left the strong impression that the Chinese are anxious to see the struggle move into the political arena. The Chinese statement made no mention of continued armed conflict, and Peking's expression of support for the Vietnamese was vague and non-committal.

5. In Cambodia, military action remains unusually light in most sections of the country.

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